

# THE IMPACT OF POLITICAL IDEOLOGY ON SPORTS POLICY SYSTEM IN TAIWAN- A STRATEGIC RELATIONS PERSPECTIVE

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## ABSTRACT

The purpose of the research was to examine the changing international situation, and changing power balance in domestic politics with regard to the development of sports policy through a strategic relations perspective. Document analysis and interviews are two of the methods adopted in this study. In each explanation sought to identify both the structural context of policy development and the explanation provided by individual policy maker. The empirical analysis of policy drew on the evidence provided by both the key actors in the state and also official report of the legislative-Yuan. Qualitative data analysis software (QSR) was used to manage and organize the data in an inductive and deductive thematic analysis. In this study, it can be to draw tentative conclusions with regard to a strategic relations perspective. First, both key makers in the Republic of China (ROC) and People's Republic of China (PRC) have taken advantage of structure in terms of global regulations to promote their interests. Secondly, the development of sport policy over the last four decades inside ROC/Taiwan has been linked to wider power struggles (particularly between the North and South; the DPP and KMT) and this has presented policy makers what resources for, and constrain on actions taken. Thirdly, one can note that while state support for sport may be superficially an 'apolitical' issue, political difference are clearly evident.

**Keywords: Political ideology, KMT, DPP, Strategic relations.**

## 政治意識型態對於台灣運動政策衝擊之探討-策略性關係的觀點

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### 摘要

本研究的目的是以策略性關係的觀點來檢視國際局勢變遷下的台灣政治權力的平衡與變遷過程對於運動政策的衝擊。文獻分析與半結構式的訪談是此一研究蒐集資料的兩個方法。使用此兩種研究方法是解明結構性的轉變中政策的發展並藉由主要的政策制定者所提供的資料來加以分析。以上方法所取得之資料以質性分析軟體加以主題式的歸納與演繹。最後,取得之資料以策略性關係的論點加以討論。透過此一觀點的檢視,本研究提出了以下三個結論。第一,政策制定者善用了國際規範所制約的結構去獲得

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他們的政治利益，第二，台灣過去四十年運動政策的發展已連結到政治權力鬥爭與資源分配，這使得政策制定者體現了資源的用途及政策執行的限制。最後，雖然政府在支持運動時常常聲稱與政治無關，然而我們常常可以從他們的政治意向中得到不同的印證。

**關鍵詞：**政治意識型態，國民黨，民進黨，策略性關係

## 1. Introduction

The paper adopts the position that there are consequences for sports policy of holding to particular ideological positions. Therefore, this paper, first, explores differences regarding political values, and the nature of power struggles in sports policy between the KMT and DPP, and how different perceptions of sports policy within the two parties diverged or overlapped at both international and national levels. Secondly, factors beyond Taiwan, are discussed, such as, what effect changes in global context have had on Taiwan?

With the Taiwan state, the new development of two political parties with ideologies, which are contrasting in some significant ways, has implications for sports policy. The major divisions between the ideologies can be defined in relation to the Mainland China issue. The parties of KMT, the People First Party (PFP), and the New Party (NP) can be described, as we shall see in the following section of this paper, as adopting a 'greater Chinese nationalist ideology'. In contrast, the DPP and the Taiwan Independence Party (TIP) are associated with a policy of 'separated development' and independence for Taiwan. Ideological differences associated with this issue have run deep since 1949. However, though its origins are in political reaction with the mainland, this ideological cleavage signals other policy implications in a wide range of what might at first sight seem unrelated policy areas.

## 2. Strategic Relations Approach

The strategic relations approach to the state has been developed by Jessop (1990) and has been debated by a number of Western scholars (cf. Hay, 1995; Kelly 1999; Henry 2001; Hay, 2002), who have attempted to extend Marxist notions of the state by going beyond the instrumental and functional/structural accounts. The strategic relations approach has in some instances focused on empirical investigation rather than being based only on theoretical accounts. Henry (2001) highlights its potential further arguing that the approach incorporates the following assumptions: a) that humankind makes its own history but not in circumstance of its own choosing, b) the current situation in society is the product of history of human action, c) to act effectively or partly effectively one needs to make use of one's strategic position in the society, political action or policy structure, and d) to understand action, the researcher needs to understand the context of actors in relation to strategic resources. These assumptions are premises shared by the author of this paper and deemed appropriate to the study of sports policy in ROC/Taiwan. Strategic relative theory was born out of a Marxist tradition but allows for non-class based issues to be investigated and, where appropriate, to privilege other structural factors in explaining the outcomes of action. It allows for contingent outcomes. It focuses on:

- a) social structure as resources
- b) history explaining the conditions on which a decision is taken or an action is taken
- c) individual actors explaining how they have drawn on the resource of their structural position

Thus, to understand action, the researcher needs to understand the context of actors in relation to strategic resources, and this premise together with those cited above therefore informs the methodology adopted in this study of sport policy in ROC/Taiwan.

### 3. Political Ideology and Its Functions in Policy

In this section we will be addressing the issue of the role of political ideology in the development of sports policy. Much of the concern with the development of political ideology has been limited to Western states, with classic distinctions between liberal, socialist, conservative and communist ideologies (non-Western but for comparison).

Ideologies have become central to political life in western countries from the onset of modernity and the enlightenment project, after the American and French Revolutions. They share the same “modern agenda and response to the problems which emerged from the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century and whose development formed the context in which the ideologies themselves unfold during the nineteen and twentieth centuries” (Schwarzmantel, 1998:151). It is important to acknowledge that for a number of theorists, particularly those of Marxist orientation, the nature of ideology is characterised in terms of the promotion of certain interests (often in a hidden manner). As Baradat (1997) has noted, political ideology is a tool to justify political parties’ position in society.

Ideology is nothing more than a fabrication used by a particular group of people to justify them.

The concepts of an ideology were completely subjective, and they were used to justify the ruling class of society. (Baradat, 1997:7.)

However, while acknowledging that there may be aspects of hidden interests in the adoption of one or other political arguments, for the purposes of the discussion in this chapter specifically and throughout the thesis more generally, the concept of ideology adopted here is closer to that advocated by Hall (1982) than by Baradat:

A framework or network of values, concepts, images and propositions which we employ in interpreting and understanding how society works. (Hall, 1982:16.)

Marxist notions of ideology as false consciousness or as solely reflecting dominant interests are neglected for reasons which are well rehearsed in the literature (Giddens, 1976).

Henry points out that “ideologies may also be prescriptive, defining how society should work” (Henry, 2001: 31), while Adams (1993) highlights the relationship of politics to ideology, and both emphasise that interests are reflected in ideological positions:

Politics is largely about reconciling conflicting views in order to come to collective decisions over what to do. Conflicting views arise because people’s interests differ...there are also broader systems of ideas about how society should be run, what values- such as justice, equality or freedom-it should embody, and these are ideologies. (Adams, 1993: 3-4.)

As Adams (1998) notes, in western countries political ideologies are driven by political parties, which embrace, for example, liberalism, socialism, nationalism or conservatism (or a mixed set of such ideologies):

Ideologies are practical doctrines aimed at changing the world, and as such in the modern world it

is political parties that are the chief vehicles. The major ideologies such as, liberalism, socialism, nationalism and conservatism have parties based upon them. (Adams, 1998: 9.)

However, it should be noted that there is an absence of a developed literature on definitions of ideology in political parties in ROC/Taiwan, and this, coupled with the inconsistency in the parties' policies, makes the clarification of certain ideological positions in ROC/Taiwan a difficult task. The political context of the ROC/Taiwan might not be strictly amenable to analysis following western theoretical models. For example, Adams (1993) has addressed Fukuyama's point of view that "the world will become increasingly like America, since all peoples aspire to American prosperity and freedom. Yet, it could be argued that if people want prosperity, better models can be found in Asia" (Adams, 1993:351). Adams (1993) noted that liberal democracy did not bring economic success in Japan, Taiwan, Singapore, South Korea and Hong Kong, but that this was achieved through a combination of the free market with various forms of authoritarian rulership.

In the Taiwanese context, many of the value positions adopted in the above are adapted to the East Asian context and in some specific respects may be unique to the Taiwanese context. The purpose of this section is to explain the role of ideology in state policy development. The rationale for such an explanation is that while political ideology has traditionally influenced the policy-making process (John, 1998), in ROC/Taiwan there are two fundamentally different political orientations. These are i) the 'Chinese Nationalist' position which mainly includes KMT, PFP (People First Party) and the NP (New Party); and ii) 'Taiwan Nationalist' which typically covers DPP and TIP (Taiwan Independent Party). Different political orientations are often (though not necessarily) linked to the different views on policy making and implementation, while KMT dominated the ROC/Taiwan state from 1949 to 2000, its political orientation on the nationalist question was a vehicle to drive their policy even in apparently tangentially related policy areas. Before proceeding with the discussion of the political values of key actors in sport policy in Taiwan, it will therefore be useful to provide a context in respect of the general ideological positions adopted by the political groups to which the above interviewees belong.

#### 4. Politics and Ideology in the ROC/Taiwan Context

Schwarzmentel (1998) has highlighted how, after World War II, nationalism was experienced as an increasingly powerful ideology influencing world politics and political events throughout the world:

Since the war, Europe has been built on a liberal project, civil society at the expense of the nation. This project is today out of breath, and the nationalist passions, with their infinitely more powerful capabilities of mobilization, are again at work. (Rupnik, 1996:71; quoted in Schwarzmentel, 1998.)

The central and consuming issue in relation to politics in the Taiwanese context relates to the relationship with Mainland China/PRC. However this issue is subtly connected to policy areas other than inter-state PRC/ROC relations. Clearly it is linked to international relations, but also to aspects of domestic policy. KMT advocates one nation but plural systems (KMT, 2002). DPP advocates separate development but with a stronger emphasis on social welfare (DPP, 2002). Rather than one element in a Greater China, the DPP is seeking to construct a state which has some local echoes of liberal democratic states elsewhere in the world – if not welfare states then certainly states with forms of social provision. The DPP project of a 'modern', autonomous state is therefore one which promotes a different approach to social welfare and therefore to sports policy.

KMT was formed with the aim of building Taiwan as an element in a Republic of China as a free, democratic, prosperous, strong and dignified modern country (KMT, 2002). The KMT was founded by Dr. Sun Yat-Sen and established three main principles to guide the party:

The three Principles of the People-Nationalism, Democracy and Economy have been the KMT's most valuable asset in its struggle for national development over the past one hundred years. Ever after the ROC government's relocation from the mainland to Taiwan in 1949, the national leaders, under the guidance of the Three Principles of the People, successfully pushed ahead with land reforms, developed the economy, implemented a democratic system and improved cross-Taiwan Strait relations, creating the admirable "Taiwan experience". Taiwan's achievements serve to prove that the ideals set forth in the Three Principles of the People are the guidelines most needed by the Chinese people. (The KMT Charter, 2002: [www.kmt.org.tw](http://www.kmt.org.tw).)

...by virtue of the mandate received from the whole body of citizens, in accordance with the teachings bequeathed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in founding the Republic of China, and in order to consolidate the authority of the State, safeguard the rights of the people, do hereby establish this Constitution, to be promulgated throughout the country for faithful and perpetual observance by all. (The National Assembly on December 25, 1946, quoted in Tien, 1992: 255.)

On the other hand, the Democratic People's Party was established on September 28, 1986. Based on the DPP Charter (2002), it has shown the main directions in social and political development in the party:

...Socially, the DPP championed social welfare policies involving the rights of women, senior citizens, children, labour, indigenous peoples, farmers, and other disadvantaged sectors of society. Politically, the DPP has led and won battles for free speech, free press, the freedom of association, and respect for human rights. Furthermore, the DPP distinguishes itself from the ruling KMT in its domestic social policies, anti-corruption stance, and efficient world community that is aimed at enhancing the prosperity and security of Taiwan. (The DPP Charter, 2002, [www.org.dpp.tw](http://www.org.dpp.tw).)

The above discussion thus reveals the potential for disparity between KMT and DPP in political ideologies.

The DPP 'model' of a 'modern' state is one in which nation building is in part a social as well as an economic and political project. Sport as with other policy areas becomes important in a variety of ways. Some detail in terms of the differences between DPP and KMT of their Mainland policies can be seen in the next section.

Since 1949 the Chinese have lived in one of two societies on either side of the Taiwan Strait with different political, economic, and social systems. The KMT policy in relation to PRC centres on unification in the deciding period (KMT, 2002). The Mainland Affairs Council established in 1992 illustrates the KMT as promoting ROC/PRC dialogue.

By adopting 'one China, two equal political entities' as the framework for cross-Strait relations, the ROC government hopes that relations will develop in a peaceful, pragmatic, and rational direction. The Peking authorities should realize that this is the best way to promote the unification of China.

In the course of cross-Strait exchanges, Peking should dismiss any misgivings it has concerning the ROC government's determination to achieve unification...Furthermore, both sides of the Taiwan Strait should adopt moderate unification policies; it is inappropriate to be too important as more haste will only mean less speed... There is no point in the Chinese seeking unification for its own sake, unification should take place under a reasonable and sound political, economic, and social system and way of life...Once the ideological, political, economic, and social gap between the two sides is bridged as a result of our joint efforts, the unification of China will come naturally. (The Mainland Affairs Council, 1999: 13-14.)

Prior to taking control in central government, the DPP insisted on Taiwan as an independent country and launched a number of initiatives to rejoin the UN both at the level of national and international communities. In addition, the establishment of a sovereign and independent Republic of Taiwan was declared as a goal in the political Charter of the DPP (DPP, 2000).

- i) In accordance with the reality of Taiwan's sovereignty, an independent country should be established and a new constitution drawn up in order to make the legal system conform to the social reality in Taiwan and in order to return to the international community according to the principles of international law.
- ii) In accordance with the reality of Taiwan's sovereignty, the scope of Taiwan's sovereignty over the land and the people should be redefined, with the double aim of creating a legal basis for dealings between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait in accordance with international law and of safeguarding the rights of people from both sides in their dealings with each other.
- iii) In accordance with the principle of preserving multi-cultural development, the educational system shall be reformed on the basis of recognizing Taiwan as a community. This shall be done so that people may gradually cultivate the recognition of their self-consciousness. Based on the fundamental rights of the people, the establishment of a sovereign Taiwan Republic and the formation of a new constitution shall be determined by all citizens of Taiwan through a national referendum. (DPP, 2002, [www.dpp.org.tw](http://www.dpp.org.tw), translated by the author.)

Marsh (2000) suggests on the basis of a survey of political opinion that there are four types of response to the question of national independence from Mainland China. These are i) Taiwan nationalist; ii) China nationalist; iii) Pragmatist and; iv) Conservative. The set of political attitudes to the PRC is illustrated in table 1.

Table 1: People’s Political Orientations to PRC in the ROC/Taiwan

Intentions	Independence (Taiwan nationalist)	Unification (China nationalist)	Pragmatist	Conservative
Context	Citizens attempt to support and recognize Taiwan as an Independent Country	Citizens attempt to reunite with the PRC	Citizens recognise the difficulties for both being independent and reunification and insist on maintaining the current political circumstances	Citizens have had no specific political intention

Source: Marsh (2000:1)

In table 2 the political attitudes to PRC are revealed as diverse, in the Mainland Advisory Council’s (2003) survey which provides an analysis of support for the options of unification or independence. The dominant view among the general population is that the ‘status quo’ should be maintained and any decision on independence or unification should be delayed.

Table 2: Political Intentions to the PRC 1997-2002

Time /Intentions	Status quo now/ Decision later	Status quo forever	Status quo now/ Unification later	Status quo now/ Independence later	Unification ASAP (*)	Independence ASAP (*)
Nov/1997	42	18.5	15.7	6.7	3.8	9.5
Aug/1998	30.5	15.3	15.3	12.9	0.8	7.4
Aug/1999	39.6	12.2	16.3	13.8	2.4	14.3
Feb/2000	35.2	19.3	19	12.5	2.4	5.8
April/2000	30.2	21.1	10.2	14.6	2.7	3.9
May/2000	42.3	16.6	16.6	12.0	4.1	5.0
July/2001	32.1	21.5	21.5	10.2	3.3	6.4
Feb/2001	38.5	15.3	15.3	14.8	1.8	3.4
Dec/2002	33.3	21.5	10.3	10	4.2	5.9

Source: The Mainland Affairs Council (2003) www.mac.org.tw

ASAP (\*): As soon as possible

Table 2 highlights the extent to which the preferences of the people of Taiwan have significantly changed. Graham highlighted the dilemma which President Chen faces in relation to the DPP policy for China from political and economic points of view:

The majority of the Taiwanese people are not in favour of outright independence, and the presence of President Chen Shui-bian, a native Taiwanese, could allow productive negotiations for some sort

of compromise based around the framework of economic integration. This can only happen, however, if the Chinese government agrees to renounce the use of force in its desire to reunite Taiwan with the Mainland China. (Graham, 2001: 212.)

Taiwan's economy continued to face a decline in 2001. While the economy dominates the government's political agenda, equally its relations with China continue to provide a long-term threat to Taiwan's security. The latest of China's military exercises was held in June 2001 and involved 10,000 troops simulating an attack on the island. It only continues to demonstrate that there still appears to be no long-term solution to the China-Taiwan problem.

It will refer here to three types of manifestation at the level of international policy which flow from the clash of ideology in relation to the issue of Greater China/Two Chinas. These are problems within the Olympic movement, problems and conflicts between the ROC and PRC in international sports events, and problems between Taiwan and other neighbouring states in sport specifically Japan and South Korea, principally of an economic nature.

## 5. Tensions within Aspects of Sports Policy and International Relations Resulting from Ideological Differences

### 5.1 Power struggles between the ROC and PRC in the Olympic Movement

Within this context, the IOC only recognised one Chinese Olympic Committee that based on Taiwan. However, in 1968 in a close vote, by 23 to 21, the IOC recognised two Chinas, both the communist controlled area, PRC and that controlled by the Nationalist ROC (Espy, 1979). The recognition caused tensions and conflicts for both the Chiang-Kai-Shek and Mao regime in the years which followed. The two sides attempted to exclude one another from the political arena through a number of political actions. The list of the battles between ROC/Taiwan and PRC in respect of the Olympic movements is illustrated in Table 3.

Table 3: Power Struggles and Tensions between ROC and PRC in the Olympic Movement

Year	Organization/ Event	Actions
1959	IOC	The IOC was negotiating with the ROC Olympic committee to readjust the title of the National Olympic Committee and finally to end recognition of the ROC Olympic Committee in 1959.
1968	IOC 68 <sup>th</sup> Annual Conference	IOC re-recognises the ROC Olympic Committee.
1972	Winter Olympic Games	ROC sends players to the Winter Olympic Games for the first time.
1976	Montreal Olympic Games	Canadian government announced its unwillingness to grant athletes from the ROC admittance to the country since Canada did not recognize that nation's existence, even though ROC was a member of the IOC.
1979	IOC	ROC Olympic Committee accused IOC of not obeying the Olympic Charter. Henry Hsu, IOC Member of the ROC, sought an injunction to prevent the IOC's



		decision to reject the ROC Olympic Committee. The Swiss court found in the ROC's favour late in 1979.
1980	Moscow Olympic Games	Due to restriction concerning the national title, flag and anthem, ROC unwilling to attend the Games.
1984	IOC	ROC rejoins the summer Olympic Games in Los Angeles.
1986	IOC	ROC attends the Games for the first time with the title of Chinese Taipei with new flag and anthem.

Sources: Lucas (1980); Miller (1992); Guttmann (1992); Houlihan (1994)

Since the DPP's first term in office from May 2000, the internal and external political environment has altered. The issue of interaction in sport with the PRC has been discussed including the immigration of sporting elites to Taiwan, both PRC elite sport coaches and PRC-born elite sports participants and their adoption of Taiwanese identity. The DPP legislators insisted on opening the door for sport interaction with the PRC before they succeeded in taking power in central government. Ironically, the DPP government did not pursue this policy during their first term in office.

As Sandschneider notes "Taiwan is a vibrant and a diversified civil society of 23 million people that has established a fully democratic system thus demonstrating that it is possible to transfer elements of western democracy into a non-western historical and cultural setting" (Sandschneider, 2002:11). This democratic evolution was evidenced by the elections of 1996 and 2000, the latter returning a government of a different political party (DPP) for the first time.

In 1986, President Chen reaffirmed the DPP principle of an 'independent Taiwan', his victory may have made the leader of the PRC nervous in political terms and could have created potential tensions between the two sides (Wu, 2001). President Chen was a legislator who had regularly challenged the foreign policy of KMT and instead advocated increased freedom of political expression.

Given over fifty years of KMT dominated central government, DPP not only has had internal political struggles with KMT but also has raised tensions with the PRC. As Van Kemenade (2001) points out:

Cross-strait and Taiwanese internal politics are more interlinked than ever before. In the short-term, Taiwanese politics are bound to see more instability and chaos, leading to a further deterioration in cross-strait relations. (Van Kemenade, 2001:55.)

At the same time, on the 21<sup>st</sup> March 2001 the President of the IOC, Juan Samaranch sent a formal letter of congratulation to President Chen and hoped that Chen would continue to support the Olympic movement in Taiwan. Two days later, Chen met Wu the IOC member at the office of Formosan Foundation in Taipei. The meeting was important for the relationship between the two sides. An oral report addressed to President Chen affirmed that the PRC Olympic Committee was going to take part in the bidding to host the 2008 Summer Olympic Games. As Wu (2001) noted the importance of helping the PRC to bid for the Games in order to reduce political tensions had been stressed and the bidding for the 2008 Summer Olympic Games would be a key issue. It would be important to support Beijing's bid for the Games. President Chen responded to Wu in a positive manner and addressed the issue with the media both nationally and internationally during the President's

inaugural ceremony in Taipei. The announcement made Wu a politically sensitive figure in the world's media. Due to the concerns about voting for the host city in 2000, IOC Member, Wu pointed out his intention for voting for the 2008 Olympic Games.

Taiwan is considering supporting Beijing to bid for 2008 Olympic Games and it may be possible that part of the sports events take place in Taiwan. (2001:228, translated by the author.)

Wu (2001) also claimed to have supported the vote for the PRC in 2000 and 2008 for the bidding city.

My vote went to PRC when PRC was bidding for the 2000 Olympic Games. This year the vote will go to PRC again for the 2008 Olympic Games...If PRC takes the Olympic Games, personally I think it will be helpful to keep peace between two sides. (Interview with IOC Member of Chinese Taipei, 1988-2003: 03/10/2001, translated by the author.)

The KMT legislator Ding (2001) supported in parliament the line taken by the IOC Member, and highlighted the importance of the decision.

According to the prediction of the IOC member, the PRC is going to bid successfully to host the Games. In order to reduce the tension between the two sides, it is the right time to release a friendly message to the PRC government... Particularly, the Ministry of Mainland Affairs and the NCPFS should plan and take the opportunities to open a positive dialogue again. (Ding, 2001: 291, translated by the author.)

The strategic political announcement with regard to the 2008 Olympic Games bidding made a number of DPP politicians challenge the role of the Chinese Taipei IOC member. DPP legislator Shie (1995), one of the key actors of DPP promoting and supporting the movement of 'independent Taiwan', argued that the IOC member had not made efforts to bid for the 2002 Asian Games for Taiwan.

The Chinese Taipei IOC member, Wu, with an unreasonable excuse, (his father's sickness), did not try his best to support the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee to bid for the 2002 Asian Games successfully... Instead, he played an important role to help promote the PRC's bid. Wu is the IOC member. His role and his authority comes from the influence itself within this IOC not the ROC government. However, the Ministry of Education should be concerned about the action. The Ministry of Education should stop the subsidies to the IOC member's office in Taipei. (Shie, 1995:500, translated by the author.)

The KMT politicians, Li and Shie (2000), have made the same argument and argued against the actions of the IOC member in supporting the PRC bid for the 2008 Olympic Games. The same author made the point further and argued that it would not be fair to other bidding cities and would jeopardize international relationships.

The IOC member of Chinese Taipei visited the IOC member of PRC to discuss the possibilities for the two sides to hold the 2008 Olympic games together...This was a surprise to the people of Taiwan. Wu is acting on behalf of IOC without going against the IOC Charter. However, Wu's

action has jeopardized the role of the IOC and was harmful to Taiwan's foreign relations with other bidding countries. (Li, 2000:574-575, translated by the author.)

Relations with the PRC are apparently somewhat better than in the past and many problems have been solved. However, the issue of the 2008 sports torch relay raised by the Taiwan media has been problematic:

The Beijing authorities want the Olympic flame to pass through Taiwan for two reasons. The first is to show the outside world that it is sincere in wanting to thaw cross-strait relations and thereby win international support. Second they plan to use such a move to create the appearance that the people on both sides of the strait are Chinese and stir up identity contradictions in Taiwan. (e-Taiwan News, 1 March 2001; quoted in Slack et al. 2002: 360.)

Such sensitivities suggest that the conflicts and struggles between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait will continue for some time into the future.

## 5.2 Conflicts between the ROC and PRC for Bidding the International Sports Events

Moving on to the 1990s, struggles in both the both political and economic domains between the ROC and PRC at international level have been very visible. Economically, ROC/Taiwan witnessed economic development in the 1980s and an economic boom during the 1990s. At the same time PRC took off in economic development from the late 1970s. As Fan (1995) notes:

...in contrast to the Maoist period, China's development philosophy since the late 1970s has emphasized efficiency rather than equity, and open door rather than self-reliance. (Fan, 1995: 421.)

The PRC also achieved its goal of economic growth up to the 1990s. The two sides have competed on a global scale using economic leverage to attempt to exclude one another from various markets through political actions. Shin (2001) provides an example of the exclusion through economic competition in the case of relations with France, with:

... the Republic of China challenging its diplomatic isolation by economic means, [in for] example the case of the ROC's efforts to develop relations with France [he goes on to describe]...the ROC's campaign to promote relations via different types of economic diplomacy and the People's Republic of China's ability to undermine the ROC's effort. (Shin, 2001:124.)

Politically, the PRC insists on the 'one China principle' and avoids portraying an image of 'two Chinas' at a global level. The two sides did not reduce tensions but increased conflicts in international sporting events. The PRC has attempted to exclude ROC/Taiwan from attending and bidding for international sport events, such as the Asian Games and East-Asia Games.

However, Miller (1992) notes, the PRC's actions in respect of ROC/Taiwan without regarding political-economic power over the years have provided a narrow view of the PRC's actions.

In so many respects they are more rational than their ideological mainland brothers. After the severe flooding in southern China in the summer of 1991, Taiwan and Hong Kong donated

substantial relief funds, Taiwan a massive \$15 million. Yet at the 1989 congress of the Olympic Council of Asia, representatives of the China National Olympic Committee had solemnly condemned the bid by Chinese Taipei National Olympic Committee to stage the Asian Games of 1998, on the grounds that the People's Republic team could not compete in the land of Chiang Kai-shek. (Miller, 1992:176.)

The doubt, which Miller raises above, can be understood in the change in policy direction by the ROC. From 1949 to the early 1970s Taiwan relied on diplomatic and military support from the US in its stand-off with Mainland China both in the international relations generally and the Olympic movement in particular. However, in the period from 1971 to 1979, the ROC renounced the United Nations and cut foreign ties with the United States of America. Following the failure of its foreign affairs initiators, the ROC government considered adopting a different approach to become involved in the new international environment. As a result, a more pragmatic approach was adopted. Joei (1994) highlights the key points of this pragmatic approach adopted by the ROC government.

Pragmatic diplomacy in its basic sense consists of expedient measures and methods adopted to deal with external relations and matters when a normal approach to official diplomacy is not operable, the practice of which is called pragmatic diplomacy or subtle diplomacy. (Joei, 1994: 298.)

The facts are that there were 20,688 people in the ROC, and 1,964 citizens in Mainland China who benefited from the policy to allow cross-strait visits. The number has increased every year by around 500 under such a pragmatic approach (NCPFS, 2001).

Following this development, the ROC Olympic Committee/Chinese Taipei also changed its strategy in seeking to rejoin the international sports community. ROC/Taiwan now embraced the IOC's decision not to allow it to use the title of Republic of China, and took the title, 'Chinese Taipei' from 1986. Under the so-called 'Olympic formula', the ROC government has focused on the aim of attending international sports events to enhance the image of the ROC.

### 5.3 Sporting Implications of Economic Rivalry with Japan and South Korea

In this section the relationship with Japan and South Korea in terms of economic aspects of policy through sport will be discussed. The issues of national identity in international interactions can be seen in the 'sports torch' incident involving Japan. This incident resulted in tensions among the PRC, Hong-Kong, Taiwan and Japan. Historically Taiwan was a colony of Japan from 1895 to 1945. Following the Second World War, Japan sought to extend its political circle to PRC and thus cut diplomatic ties with ROC/Taiwan in September 1972. In terms of economic interactions, however, the two sides have become increasingly close since 1972, while politically Japan has adopted a strategic approach to developing relations with the PRC. Economically and culturally, Japan has emphasized the political interaction with ROC/Taiwan.

In terms of sport, the '1990 Taiwan Provincial Games' raised tensions between the governments of Japan and ROC/Taiwan. 'Fishing Island' is a small island located to the North-East of Taiwan. Following the Second World War, the PRC, Japan and Taiwan all claimed the legitimate right to the territory, and this has remained a

key issue especially for ROC/Taiwan and Japan. This remains an unresolved case at the level of the international courts.

The '1990 Taiwan Provincial Games' were being staged in Kaohsiung, the second largest city in Taiwan and ruled by the KMT Party. The city government decided to deliver the 'torch' of the Games to the island as a symbolic gesture of ownership. Politicians from both the KMT and the DPP have raised this sport issue in relation to the argument of national identity between ROC and the Taiwan state. Both KMT and DPP legislators argue on the one hand, that central government has not paid attention to the issue and jeopardised the national image and right of the 'Taiwan' state to the island; on the other hand, legislators also suggested that the Mayor of Kaohsiung take political responsibility for this event.

The DPP was established in 1986 and gained seats in the Legislative-Yuan in 1989. The new opposition party had differing views on the issue of the sports torch. The main focus was the use of the title of 'Taiwan state' and the right of the 'Taiwan state' to the island.

The KMT government was exiled from Mainland China and caused tension between Taiwanese and Mainlander...We need to recognize and understand that Taiwan is a state, with its own government, territory, legitimacy. Taiwan is an independent country. (Tian, 1990: 178-180; Lu, 1990:55, translated by the author.)

The Mainlander Executive-Yuan leader, Hau (1990) responded to the argument with an ambiguous explanation.

The action of delivering the sport torch was considered by central government...The government cannot stop the people, those who attempted to assert their right to the land. The Executive-Yuan has no right to halt the action and the central government evaluated this action as a reasonable means of asserting Taiwanese right effect ...The ROC government will continue to maintain the right of taking suitable action to protect its people. At the same time, the government would not consider taking military action. (Hau, 1990: 55, translated by the author.)

Significant arguments and discussions have been raised in parliament. In particular, the opposition party successfully lobbied for the record of martial law in and after 1987. The ROC removed 'martial law' and opened the door to the PRC for individuals to visit in 1987 to increase interactions. The policy focused on Mainlanders, those who moved from Mainland China to Taiwan after 1945, to visit their families living in PRC. The DPP politician Wu (1987) argued that central government has considered the policy to PRC in a practical way; ironically, however, the KMT central government forbade interaction between academics and those involved in sport. Sport, art and cultural activities would be easier for interaction in the initial stages.

The Minister of Foreign Affairs announced the policy to the PRC that opens all sorts of academic and sport interactions to the communist countries without PRC. The KMT government insisted on banning all international academic and sports events to PRC...The policy apparently obeyed the will of majority of people in Taiwan... Opening the door to PRC has already gained huge support from people in Taiwan and also international society. More interactions would be expected between sports culture and academics. These types of interaction between the ROC and PRC could be more

flexible for the two sides to interact. (the DPP legislator, Wu, 1987: 47, translated by the author.)

The Minister of Education, Mau (1988) responded to the DPP politician Chen and claimed the policy that ROC would not join the Asian Games. Chen (1988) highlights the relationship between politics and sport, and notes the importance of rejoining global society.

The KMT government announced a number of times that politics and sport cannot overlap...As a result, attending 1990 Beijing Asian Games would be nothing in relation to politics...Furthermore, rejoining international affairs is the key policy of the government, and attending the Games is one of the best ways to achieve it. (Chen, 1988: 39, translated by the author.)

The other issues of sports interaction with the PRC discussed in the 1990s include the immigration of sporting elites to Taiwan, adopting PRC's elite sports coaches and the representatives of the PRC born sports elites to Taiwanese identity. ROC/Taiwan has experienced political and economic transition, and increased interaction with PRC because of both internal and external factors. Externally, the collapse of the USSR in 1991, France and the US agreeing to sell the modern fighter jets to Taiwan and, both PRC and ROC joining the WTO in 2001 have influenced both countries. Internally, the power struggle of the KMT politicians whose family origin both lay in Mainland China and local born Taiwanese in the KMT in 1990 has increased. The DPP recognising Taiwan independence in its political Charter in 1991, President Lee visiting South Asia for economic cooperation in 1994 and visiting the US for political discussions in 1995. Those reflect changing circumstances. More seriously, the '1996 missile threat' in the Taiwan Strait raised significant tensions in the 1990s.

The PFP politician Huang (2002) pointed out the relationship between Japan and Korea and centred on the possibilities for cooperation between Taiwan and PRC:

Historically and politically, there are huge and deep conflicts and tensions between Japan and Korea...They both gained benefits through the 2002 Korea-Japan Football World Cup. The government should consider baseball and basketball as the two main sports in Taiwan and set up the first priorities to these two sports...Furthermore, the idea of two nations or parties hosting international sports events together, this should be promoted. (Huang, 2002, translated by the author.)

The PFP legislator, Jeng (2002) argues that:

The prohibition of the DPP government's policy regarding individual sport elites and groups to visit PRC for participating in sports events would significantly damage sports development in Taiwan in terms of sports related industry. (Jeng, 2002: 224-225, translated by the author.)

The DPP government responded to these issues in Parliament and stressed two key directions:

The DPP government has seriously considered the needs of sport development in Taiwan...The DPP government has started to establish the 'Act and Charter' to regulate the interaction with PRC, particularly with individuals. In terms of sports groups and organisations reflecting on the political

interaction with PRC, the DPP government will consider carefully and make such intervention possible at a later date. (The Executive Yuan, 2002, translated by the author.)

President of the PRC Olympic Committee, Yuan Wei-Min, visited the ROC/Taiwan for the first time in attending 'the 4<sup>th</sup> cross-straits Olympic Exchange Conference' (a series which began in April 1996), in 2001 before the voting for the 2008 summer Olympic Games (NCPFS, 2001). At the same time, many of the key actors in the COC (Chinese Olympic Committee) visited ROC/Taiwan to attend the 'Sports Administration Personnel Delegation' including six high and middle-ranking COC cadres and five major actors in the PRC Sports Federation (NCPFS, 2001). Apparently, the Chinese Taipei IOC member's efforts and the DPP government's strategic approaches had been also to ease the tension in terms of sports interactions. The DPP's foreign policy towards the PRC in the initial stages can be seen as a conservative approach and reflects its general party policy to PRC. This reflects its different political ideology to the PRC and also its attempts to strengthen the ideology of 'Taiwan nationalism' for the inhabitants of Taiwan in the initial stage.

#### 6. Political Values and the Positions Adopted in Relation to Hosting Sports Events in Taiwan – The Debate over Naming the National/Provincial Games

Sport has been used within the ROC/Taiwan state to promote recognition of an 'independent state' of democratic China. The titles of sports events have played an important symbolic role in the power struggle between the KMT and the DPP. According to Lien's (1991) explanations, the 'Taiwan Area Games' was formerly known as the Taiwan Provincial Games and established in Taipei in 1946. Taipei upgraded to the main city in Taiwan and withdrew from hosting the sports event in 1967. In 1974, due to financial limitations, the DPE reduced the finance for personnel for the sports event and for improving the performance elite sports persons. The Ministry of Education therefore combined the Taiwan Province Games and Taipei City Games into the Taiwan Area Games in 1974. More recently, in 1999, due to the national identity argument in Parliament, the title was changed to the 'National Sports Games'.

The title of sports events plays a significant political symbolic role in Taiwan. Where the title of 'Republic of China' or 'Taiwan State' is used is of political significance. The Ministry of Education considered the realities and established the Charter to regulate hosting sport events in ROC/Taiwan in 1995. According to item three of the 'Act' regarding hosting sports events, the Taiwan Area Games changed to the 'National Sport Games' in 1996. DPP legislator Yan (1995) argued Taiwan had been ruled by Japan for fifty years and the Executive-Yuan should celebrate the fact by inaugurating the title the 1<sup>st</sup> 'National Sport Games'. It would be a shame, it was argued, if Taiwan had the possibility of independence but still did not have its own national games.

...the ROC took over Taiwan from Japan for fifty years; however, the KMT government still did not face the political reality. KMT claimed a right to control PRC, or at least be part of the without recognising the political independence of the Taiwan state. The Ministry should follow the new Act to hold the National sports Games on time next year. According to the regulations, it should not be impossible to hold the Games next year. (Yan, 1995: 397, translated by the author.)

The 'National Sports Games' began in 1999. The NP legislator Chen (1998) asked the leader of Executive-Yuan what is meant by the title of the 'National Sports Games'.

... the national sports games would be held next year. However, what is the political reality of “national”? Are they ‘ROC’, ‘Taiwan State’, ROC on Taiwan or ROC (Taiwan)? (Chen, 1998: 73, translated by the author.)

Due to a severe earthquake, in 1999 the First National Sports Games had to be postponed. The KMT legislator Ju (1999) argued that the Games should be cancelled to concentrate on recovering from the earthquake. DPP legislator Lin (1999) argued for the latter and points out the relationship between the earthquake and national sport events.

The First ‘National Sports Games’ is the most important games in the country with historical significance...Due to the earthquake, the Tau-yuan County has launched an emergency meeting with all the local sports authorities and decided to hold the games three months later...The reason to continue the games is as follows: firstly, the sport elite needs an event to examine their efforts in order to improve performance at international sports events; secondly, all the local sports authorities disagree with postponing the games; finally, it is an opportunity to encourage people to recover from the earthquake. (Lin, 1999: 461-463, translated by the author.)

The arguments between KMT and DPP politicians indicated the difference of political attitude to sports events. This is connected to the political structure in Taiwan. The next section explores this relationship.

#### 7.1 Political Values and the Positions Adopted in Relation to Hosting International Sports Events in Taiwan – The Debate over International Sports Events Bids

This section examines the realities of sports bids, explores the criteria for bidding for international sports events, and examines the abilities of ROC/Taiwan to bid for such events. Evidence from interviews suggests that the majority of interviewees were in favour of international sport events bids. The rationales of ROC/Taiwan to bid for the Games can be divided into the following points i) to demonstrate ability to manage international sports events; ii) the existence of sufficient sports facilities and staff, iii) to promote the national image and identity; iv) economic benefits and v) political issues.

Some key actors in central government also provided an overview of the constraints for bidding for international events. The Director of the Department of Physical Education, Wu (2001), highlighted factors for bidding for the Games such as the chance to develop sports facilities. He stressed the importance of providing excellent sport facilities for the Games at international level.

There are some practical issues government has to consider before bidding for international sports events...i) to gain more experience in managing a single international sports event; ii) more funding for sport development to promote national identity, iii) improving the ability to manage the event. (Interview with Director of DPE, 1998-2003: 03/18/01, translated by the author.)

In addition, perceptions of the key actors in central government, including the DPE and the NCPFS suggest that national prestige and image might be the most important aspects in bidding for the Games.

To hold the Asian or Olympic Games, Taiwan will benefit from promoting the national identity of



Taiwan as well as from encouraging more people to attend sports. In order to achieve these goals, the government should focus on both how to achieve gold medals as well as on how to reach a high standard of managing international events. (Interview with Director of the DPE, 1998-2003: 03/18/01, translated by the author.)

However, the IOC Member from Chinese Taipei, Wu (2001), highlighted both the benefit of bidding for the Games externally and the importance of reinforcing the Game's management.

Bidding for the Games successfully, the benefits are visible...more sports participation can be predicted; better images of Taiwan can be achieved... it will be very positive to host international sports events like the Asian, or the Olympic Games in Taiwan. By doing so, Taiwan should pay attention to enhance its ability to achieve gold medals, and to reach a higher quality of managing international events. (Interview with Director of DPE, 1998-2003: 03/18/01, translated by the author.)

Furthermore, politically, the 'one China principle' plays a central role in bidding for the Games. Interviewees from both the DPE and the NCPFS highlighted the practical difficulties of hosting an opening ceremony with 'two Chinas' involved.

In fact, without solving political issues such as 'one China principle', it is very difficult to bid for the Games successfully...The key issue is, which state represents 'China'... The Asian Games and Olympic Games in the opening ceremony require the nation's leader to announce the beginning of the Games in the country. It appears to be a sophisticated political issue between Taiwan and PRC. (Interview with Director of DPE 1982-1986: 04/28/01, translated by the author.)

Shiu (2001) also highlighted the unacceptable situation of holding international sports events without flying the ROC/Taiwan national flag.

Taiwan has suffered from not being allowed to unfurl its 'national flag' at international sports events...If Taiwan hosts the Games without unfurling our national flag, it will be painful for people in Taiwan. (Interview with Chairperson of NCPFS 2000-2002: 03/29/01, translated by the author.)

The dilemma for ROC/Taiwan to bid for international sports events can be illustrated by the explanation of two of the PRC's scholars on PRC recognition, of Taiwan as part of China. This sensitive political issue significantly constrains the bidding for international sports events.

Taiwan is a province of China. Taiwan sports organizations should be under the leadership of the Chinese Olympic Committee. Item 24 of the Olympic Charter rules that within one country, there is only one Olympic Committee that organizes activities according to the Olympic Charter and the Olympic Ideal. (Fan and Xiong, 2002: 325.)

The following section will explore the constraints and strengths of Taiwan bidding for major events, particularly the political issues.

## 7.2 Political Constraints and Sports Reality in Bidding for Major Events

Since ROC/Taiwan takes a political position against the PRC in international relations, practices such as the ‘one China principle’ and ‘Olympic formula’ have been reinforced in the bidding for international sports events. Chinese Taipei IOC Member, Wu (2001) argued that political rather than logistical issues would be the dominant ones in bidding for international sports events at the present time between the two sides.

Internationally, under the ‘one China principle’, it is impossible for Taiwan to bid for the Games successfully at the present time in my opinion...Nationally, we also need to examine Taiwan’s abilities to provide sports facilities and to enhance sport excellence to win gold medals...Under the ‘one China principle’ Taiwan has been bombarded with negotiations and tensions for over thirty years. Take the 1990 Asian Games in Beijing as an example; we had arguments between representatives over names i.e. ‘China Taipei’ and ‘Chinese Taipei’ in Chinese when the Games were held in Beijing...Over the past thirty years, tensions between the two sides have been escalating regarding the representatives of China. Indeed, the PRC has exercised power to prevent Chinese Taipei bidding for the Asian Games in 1990 and 1995 respectively. (Interview with IOC Member of Chinese Taipei 1988-2003: 03/10/01, translated by the author.)

Since bidding for international sport events is a key sports policy of the DPE and NCPFS (NCPFS, 1999), the procedures and problems surrounding are important issues. KMT legislator Pan (1994) presented the difficulties of bidding for the Asian Games in parliament, arguing that Taiwan should not only consider internal issues but also the external challenge from the PRC:

The Ministry of Education has bid for the Asian Games without considering the political issues...To bid for the Games successfully or not is not only a financial issue but also a political issue with the PRC...However, the Ministry of Education did not address the issue of the national flag, or the national anthem, which would cause political arguments with the PRC nor did it provide details of the NOC’s abilities to gain medals.

The KMT legislator Ding (1994) echoes this in arguing that, “without consensus between the Ministry of Education, the Council of Mainland Affairs and the Ministry of Interior, it would be difficult to bid for the Games” (Ding, 1994:229, translated by the author).

Understanding of the significance of the Asian Games is informed by an appreciation of the history of Taiwan’s participation and its performance. The ROC was absent from the 1<sup>st</sup>, 4<sup>th</sup>, 7<sup>th</sup>, 8<sup>th</sup>, 9<sup>th</sup> and 10<sup>th</sup> Asian Games because of a political problem. ROC/Taiwan first attended the Asian Games in 1954, the 2<sup>nd</sup> Asian Games and gained 6<sup>th</sup> place at that time. ROC/Taiwan rejoined the Games in the 11<sup>th</sup> Asian Games. This performance in the last Games was 7<sup>th</sup> place. Taiwan is thus certainly among the leading nations in sporting terms in Asia, it not in the very top fight, and should have the ability to host the Games.

However, the problem of dealing with the obstruction of any bid by the PRC is paramount. Chan (2002) suggested that the possibility of political co-operation between the two sides would be doubtful without a political solution to the two China problems.

The award of the 2008 Olympic Games to Beijing has animated the people of China, but has raised

hopes, as well as fears, among the Taiwanese. The Olympic movement has enabled both countries to participate in international sports under the so-called 'Olympic formula'. It has also stimulated cooperation between them in such areas as science and trade. Can the Beijing Games bring the two sides closer together through the co-hosting of some events? Three issues may stand in the way: operational feasibility, juridical consent and political agreement. The most intractable problem is the 'One China Principle', a condition set by Beijing for further cooperation. The co-hosting project is not impossible, provided both sides have the political will to make it work. At the moment, however, this political will seems to be wanting. (Chan, 2002:141.)

In 2000, the DPP took power in central government with its political slogan of 'Taiwan Independent'. This seemed to rule out any prospect of cooperation. The premier of the DPP, Chang, (2001) rescinded President Chen's announcement and in response to a question from a KMT legislator argued that under the 'One China Principle' it would be impossible to host any sport for the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games:

President Chen claims that the public fully support the PRC to bid the 2008 Olympic Games...However, if the PRC insists on the 'One China Principle' as a condition for co-hosting part of the Games in Taiwan, the DPP government do not agree. The DPP government will only accept any sports interaction if it does not prejudice Taiwan's legitimate rights in the international community. (Premier of Executive Yuan, Chang, 2001:101, translated by the author.)

#### 8. Political Values in Hosting International Sports Events in Taiwan: Resources Distribution between the North and the South of Taiwan

Arguments about the balance of the resources distribution between north and south Taiwan have generally existed over the years. To explain this it is necessary to trace political development at the south-north level in Taiwan since the Second World War. When the nationalists arrived, there were conflicts between the Chang Kai-shek regime and local people particularly in the south part of Taiwan following the tragic '228 social movement' in 1947 in which thousands of people were killed in south Taiwan by the Mainlander military (Yu, 1995). Given this historical tragedy, the DPP has had powerful support in south Taiwan. According to statistics from the Ministry of Interior, the DPP has held the majority of the vote in local governmental and presidential elections in the south virtually since its inception, while the KMT held the advantage in north Taiwan. The DPP holds the majority in South Taiwan including Kaohsiung city, while the KMT holds the majority of north Taiwan including Taipei.

The competition to promote a representative city for the 2002 Asian Games raised the north-south argument in sport. The KMT legislator Lin (1994) argued that the selection of the bidding city for the 2002 Asian Games was unbalanced. It is doubtful whether international sports events could only take place in the city of Taipei or in Kaohsiung in ROC/Taiwan; they would at least require support from surrounding local authorities.

The Executive-Yuan has claimed and announced that bidding for the 2002 Asian Games is the main policy in central government...however, Taipei County takes more advantages than Taipei...Taipei County has an international standard Dome, supported by Sports Colleges, is rich in

tourist resources and flexible transportation networks. (Lin, 1994:188, translated by the author.)

Finally, Kaohsiung won the right to bid for the 2002 Asian Games. In terms of sports facilities, south Taiwan had made efforts to maintain, renew and establish sports facilities to meet the needs. However, the KMT legislator Luo (1995) highlighted the shortage of sports college/education in south Taiwan to support international sports events.

Since Kaohsiung will be entitled to bid for the 2002 Asian Games, most of the sports facilities will be maintained or established in this area. However, most sports education institutes are located in north and central Taiwan. South Taiwan still does not have any sport institutions. In order to facilitate the development of sport in South Taiwan and balance the sport education between north and south, a Sports College or Institute is necessary in the south. (Luo, 1995:134-135, translated by the author.)

Such observations reflect the unbalanced resource distribution between south and north Taiwan with regard to sport in relation to political traditions at local government level, and reflect a more or less overt form of clientelism between the major parties nationally, and their local political support.

## 9. Conclusions

Overall, reviewing these themes, it is clear that sports policy debates cannot be understood without a clear understanding of ROC/Taiwan's changing international situation, and the changing power balance in domestic politics. These themes offer the potential for an analysis of broader political, social debates particularly in terms of strategic relations between internal and external actors in the ROC/Taiwan context. Nevertheless, in relation to these observations, it is possible to draw tentative conclusions with regard to a strategic relations perspective. First, both key actors in the ROC/Taiwan and the PRC have taken advantage of structure in terms of global regulations to promote their interests. Secondly, the development of sport policy over the last four decades inside ROC/Taiwan has been linked to wider power struggles (particularly between North and South, DPP and KMT) and this has presented actors what resources for, and constrain on actions taken. Thirdly, one can note that while state support for sport may be superficially an 'apolitical' issue, political difference are clearly evident.

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